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In East Asia, inter-state security challenges are serious. In this region, power
relations between states are complex and potential sources of conflict are •[.
widespread. Perhaps most notably, the rise ofChina has had profound impacts }
on this country's relations with its neighbouring countries, such as Japan and
the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The
Sino-Japanese rivalry has been aggravated by the development ofnationalism
in each country. China and Japan are in dispute over the sovereignty of the
Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands and the maritime boundary in the East China Sea.
ASEAN-China relations are marked by a significant level ofdisparity between
the material capabilities of the two parties. In the South China Sea, China is
in territorial disputes with many of the ASEAN members over the Spratly
Islands. In addition, the question of sovereignty over Taiwan has remained
unresolved for half a century, as Beijing has shown no sign of compromise
on this issue. Moreover, for the same half century, the Korean Peninsula has
been divided into two countries, and the development of nuclear weapons by
Pyongyang in recent years is complicating the country's relations not only with
its neighbours but also with external powers such as the US.
Nonetheless, it is fair to say that security order - defined as rule-governed
interaction among states in their pursuit of private and public security goals -
does exist in East Asia today (Alagappa, 2003a: x; Alagappa, 2003b: 24),
contrary to the pessimistic assessment of regional security made in the early
1990sby several authors (Friedberg, 1993; Betts, 1993; Buzan and Segal, 1994;
Segal, 1996). Inter-state relations have not been disrupted by direct military ;•
confrontations, although there have been a few crises, such as the Taiwan Strait
crisis in 1995-96 and the Mischief incident in February 1995 between China
and the Philippines in the South China Sea.
On this basis, the present chapter seeks to enhance our understanding of
regional security governance in East Asia today, by exploring three sets of
questions. Thus the first section of this chapter addresses the questions ofwhat
i
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kinds ofmeasures have been taken for East Asian regional security governance,
and what the characteristics ofsuch measures are. Two types ofmeasures have
been taken in this region, both of which have unique characteristics: power
balancing and cooperative security. Power balancing in East Asia is
characterized by the prevalence of bilateralism and of 'hard balancing'
strategies. Cooperative security in this region is characterized by the leading
role of minor powers and by an informal approach to cooperation.
The second section explores questions that involve an intra-regional
comparison: in what ways have the East Asian countries combined these two
measures, and in what terms have they defined the relations between the two?
The Northeast and Southeast Asian countries have combined power balancing
and cooperative security in different ways, thereby defining their relations
differently. Japan has prioritized power-balancing measures, and used coopera
tive security as a complement to these measures. In contrast, ASEAN has
prioritized cooperative security, thereby pursuing it as a substitute for power-
balancing measures.
The third section addresses a moral issue, by seeking to assess which ofthese
two measures is more appropriate. In East Asia, it is too simplistic to assume
that cooperative security is morally superior to power balancing, although the
former is free from a security dilemma in the traditional sense. For the sake
of'human security' in East Asia, cooperative security can hardly be considered
an appropriate measure for regional governance. The concluding section
discusses the implications of the arguments in this chapter for the overall
themes of the present edited volume, i.e., the density and normativity of
regional security governance.
Before proceeding any further, a few points should be made. To begin with,
the term 'East Asia' in this chapter refers to the area encompassing Northeast
and Southeast Asia. According to Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, in the post-
Cold War era, Northeast and Southeast Asia have formed a single regional
security complex - a group of states that possess a degree of security
interdependence, or a set of units that are so interlinked that their security
problems cannot be resolved apart from one another. The East Asian regional
securitycomplex includes the US, which has a significant stake in Asian affairs,
and also Taiwan and North Korea, although their sovereignty is not recognized
by all the Asian countries (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 44, 47, 144).
The main focus in this chapter is on the security governance measures taken
by the 'Western' countries in East Asia - i.e. the countries that belonged to
the Western bloc during the Cold War, such as Japan, South Korea and the
ASEAN members at the time, namely, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Singapore,Thailand and Brunei.1 The policies ofcountries such as China and
North Korea form another important theme, which should be explored in future
research.
The notion of security adopted in this chapter is broad. The starting point
of analysis is the observation that there is order in the East Asian region, despite
the pervasiveness of inter-state security challenges. Yet the focus of analysis
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will not be limited to inter-state security relations. In the concluding section,
human security or human rights issues will also be covered. However, it should
be noted that the present chapter does not cover every important security issue.
Along with the two sets of issues mentioned so far - inter-state security and
human security issues - at least two other sets of issues are serious in East
Asia. First, transnational criminal practices such as the drug trade and human
trafficking are rampant, in Southeast Asia in particular. Second, the prolifera
tion of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) has been a major threat to the
security of the Korean Peninsula and beyond. The development of measures
to address these issues should be examined in future research.
Two measures
What kinds of measures have been taken for East Asian regional security
governance, and what are the characteristics of such measures? The measures
taken by the countries of East Asia can be largely divided into two categories:
power balancing and cooperative security (Table 4.1). Neither of these two
concepts is peculiar to Asia. In other words, both power balancing and
cooperative security have been practised in various parts of the world.
However, the measures pursued in East Asia have some unique characteristics
that make the overall structure ofsecurity governance in this region distinctive.
Power balancing
Poweris probablyone ofthe mostenduringclassicalconceptsused in the field
of international relations (IR), and most students of IR must be familiar with
the logic of powerbalancing. In EastAsiatoday, a setofsecurity arrangements
between the US and its partners is operating on the basis of this logic. These
arrangements include: the formal defence treaties of the US with Japan, South
Korea, the Philippines and Thailand, all of which were concluded during
the Cold War; a series of memoranda of understanding that countries such as
Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesiaconcluded in the 1990swith Washington,
allowing US warships to visit their ports and use their facilities; and various
frameworks for joint military exercises. These arrangements are exclusive in
Table 4.1 Characteristics of regional security governance measures in East Asia
Power balancing Cooperative security
Nature Exclusive Inclusive
Form Bilateral Multilateral
Leading player Superpower Minor powers
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nature, and are premised on the existence ofpotential adversaries - in this case,
China and North Korea. Yet, ironically, the US-Japan security alliance,
which is one of the core elements of the US-centred power arrangements, is| acknowledged - ifnot entirely supported- by an important potential adversary,
namely, China. According to the 'cork in the bottle' theory, the alliance
prevents Japanese militarism from re-emerging. To the extent that the alliance
serves as the cork in the bottle that contains Japanese militarism, the US
presence in Asia is acceptable to Beijing.
Two characteristics stand out with regard to the power-balancing measures
in East Asia: the prevalence of bilateralism and the prevalence of 'hard
balancing' strategies founded on military capabilities.
Bilateralism
The power-balancing measures in East Asia are founded on a network of
bilateral arrangements centred on the US. This network is commonly referred
to as the 'hub-and-spoke' system, in which Washington constitutes the hub of
#§ a wheel. The form of the security arrangements involving the US in East Asia
is in sharp contrast to that in Europe - namely, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization(NATO), which is a multilateralmilitary organization. To be sure,
there are also some multilateral arrangements in this region. The Cobra Gold,
a series of joint military exercises involving the US and many of its Asian
partners, is a case in point. However, these arrangements are founded on the
hub-and-spoke system, and it is unlikely that they will develop into a
multilateral collective defence organization comparable to those in other parts
of the world, such as NATO, at least in the foreseeable future. In short,
bilateralism is predominant in East Asia, as far as power balancing is concerned.
The question of why bilateralism is so predominant has been a subject of
debate. In other words, students of Asian security have been exploring the
question of why, in Asia, there is no multilateral defence organization com
parable to NATO. According to Christopher Hemmer and Peter Katzenstein,
this issue cannot be approached without taking into consideration the issue of
identity. The Americans and Asians do not share a common identity. They are
ethnically different, have different religions, and do not share common political
values (Hemmer and Katzenstein, 2002). John Duffield shed light on another
important factor in East Asia, namely, the historical memories of the Second
World War. These memories have made many countries of Asia reluctant to
cooperate with Japan in the military sphere (Duffield, 2001). Kent Calder and
Min Ye focus on the role ofthe 'critical juncture' ofthe Korean War. The crisis
in the Korean Peninsula mandated the creation of a credible Pacific security
framework as rapidly as possible. In other words, the time pressure created the
bias toward bilateralism (Calder and Ye, 2004; Calder, 2008).
A more standard approach is to focus on the capability gap between
Washington and its Asian partners. Multilateral security institutions constrain
the policy autonomy of a dominant power (Weber, 1993: 235-37; Ikenberry,
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2002). The US possesses greater material capabilities than do Asian countries,
andmultilateral arrangements would givethese countries a greatersay, thereby
undermining Washington's dominant position against them. Thiswasprobably
one of the reasons why the US preferred bilateralism in Asia during the Cold
War era, although it strengthened NATO in Europe. The capability gap
between Washington and its partners was more significant in Asia than in
Europe. As John Ikenberry maintains, the US was both more dominant in Asia
and needed less from Asia. Hence, bilateralism was the preferred strategy. In
Asia, the US was an unchallenged hegemonic power, and thus had few
incentives to seek multilateralism, which would reduce its policy autonomy
(Ikenberry, 2002: 130; also see Katzenstein, 1997: 23).
Hard balancing
Today, what can be regarded as 'hard balancing' strategies are predominant
in East Asia. In other words, power-balancing measures in this region are based
on the notion of collective defence in a traditional sense, which is associated
with measures to counterbalance the military power of potential adversaries
through military means. The US-centred hub-and-spoke system is constituted
by various forms of military arrangements. Many of these arrangements are
founded on formal defence treaties, although some of them are based on
memoranda of understanding. The prevalence of hard-balancing strategies in
East Asia is notable because 'soft balancing' diplomacy is widely practised
in various parts of the world today. According to T. V. Paul and his colleagues,
soft balancing diplomacy is non-offensive and non-threatening. It commonly
involves building tacit non-offensive coalitions, intended to neutralize the
power of potentially threatening states. Examples of soft balancing include
the partnership between China and Russia in the 1990s, aimed at countering
the influence of the US at the global level (Paul et al.t 2004).
In what terms can the dominance of hard-balancing strategies in East Asia
be comprehended? A standard approach would be to argue that it reflects the
difficulty ofthe security dilemma operating in this region in the post-Cold War
era. Many of the Asian countries have been concerned about the increasing
military power of China. In addition, Japan has also been apprehensive about
the unclear and missile programmes of North Korea. South Korea has also
been attentive to the military development across its northern border.
Yet for a fuller understanding ofthe issue, it is also useful to take a temporal
view, and focus on the path-dependent development of security governance
measures. The military alliances of Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and
Thailand with the US were concluded during the Cold War, to deal with the
threat ofthe Eastern bloc. When the Cold War ended, for these Asian countries
a military alliance was the default option. The existence of alliances was the
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Cooperative security
Cooperative security is one of the most popular terms used in the post-Cold
War era. It can be defined as efforts to achieve security among all participants
through non-military and non-coercive means, without attributing either friend
or enemy status to the participants involved.3 This notion has been used to
capture various kinds of activity in different contexts. It is frequently used in
the context of security cooperation in the Organization for Security and Co
operation in Europe (OSCE, 2000: 2-3). It is often used to discuss the
partnership of NATO with the former Easternbloc countries (Adler, 2008). It
is also used to cover efforts to regulate the proliferation of nuclear weapons,
conventional weapons and advanced military technologies (Nolan, 1994: 10).
In East Asia today, several cooperative security frameworks exist, all ofwhich
are inclusive and multilateral. They include: the ASEAN Regional Forum
(ARF), which held its first meeting in 1994, involving almost all the countries
in the Asia-Pacific region; the ASEAN Plus Three (APT), which met first at
a summit meeting in 1997, involving China, South Korea and Japan; and the
East Asia Summit (EAS), launched in 2005 and involving the ASEAN
members, China, South Korea, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and India.4
Two characteristics stand out with regard to the cooperative security
arrangements in East Asia: the leading role of the minor powers and an
informal approach to cooperation.
Leadership ofthe minorpowers
Cooperative security in East Asia has been led by an association of minor
powers in Southeast Asia. The frameworks mentioned above - the ARF, the
APT, the EAS - constitute ASEAN's cooperative security enterprise. ASEAN
is at the centre ofsecurity regionalism, which involves various major powers.
This association has been in a position to set agendas for regional security
cooperation, determining which security issues should be addressed, and in
what ways. This is remarkable, bearing in mind that students of IR tend to
focus on the role of great powers in shaping regional order (see, for example,
Waltz, 1979: 72-73; Mearsheimer, 2001: 5; Katzenstein, 2005). It is worth
mentioning that the leadership of the minor powers is by no means a
prerequisite for the promotion of cooperative security. To illustrate, the
cooperative aspect ofNATO activities in the post-Cold War era should not be
seen as being dominated by the minor powers in the alliance.
ASEAN's centrality to East Asian cooperative security has been determined
by two factors. The first is the background condition of rivalry between the
great powers. Any cooperative security institution led by Tokyo or Washington
would probably be rejected by Beijing, and vice versa. Against the background
of rivalries between these powers, ASEAN has been in a unique position. In
this view, it has been able to assume the leading role by default. Yet this is
only half the story, and there is something more to tell. The great power
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rivalries do make it difficult for Washington, Tokyo or Beijing to play a leading
role, but do not automatically constitute an environment that defines ASEAN
as the centre of security regionalism. The second factor is the agency of
the Southeast Asian countries, concerning the construction of the social
environment defining ASEAN's centrality. In the wake of the Cold War, the
Southeast Asian countries began to make conscious efforts to promote
cooperative security, although other policy options were also available, as will
be argued later. By developing their cooperative security enterprise and
promoting their cooperative security norm, these countries have constructed
an environment that defines ASEAN's centrality to East Asia and the Asia-
Pacific region.
Informal style
The cooperative security arrangements in East Asia are distinctively informal,
in terms ofconstraint mechanisms and of the degree of institutionalization. In
ASEAN's cooperative security enterprise, the central constraint on the
behaviour of its participant countries is neither material nor legal, but
normative. This enterprise is characterized by a low degree of institutional
ization, or the absence of concrete institutional mechanisms to monitor the
behaviour of its participant countries and to impose sanctions on countries that
violate the rules. ASEAN's informal approach is in strong contrast to that of
the OSCE participant countries. In the post-Cold War era, these participant
countries accelerated the process of institutionalizing their organization, and
began to take on new responsibilities and challenges, including the prevention
and resolution of conflicts, democratization processes, and the protection of
ethnic minorities (see OSCE, 2000: 42-43; OCSE, 2008). They also adopted
the so-called consensus-minus-one rule, which provided that decisions could
be taken without the consent of the state concerned, in cases ofgross violation
of humanitarian commitments (CSCE, 1992; OSCE, 2008: 14). In East Asia,
in contrast, no similar institutional developments can be observed. Cooperation
is promoted on the basis of dialogue, decisions are made by consensus, and
few concrete measures for the prevention and resolution ofconflicts have been
institutionalized.
The key to understanding the operation of cooperative security in Asia is
the norm of security cooperation promoted by ASEAN (Katsumata, 2009a).
This norm concerns the notion that security should be pursued cooperatively
and non-militarily, by enhancing a sense of mutual understanding and trust
through dialogue and consultation. ASEAN's cooperative security enterprise
embodies a norm-building exercise, in which the Southeast Asia countries
practise their norm in order to promote it across the Asia-Pacific region. The
concrete aims of ASEAN's forums such as the ARF are two in number.
The first is to constrain the behaviour of non-ASEAN participant countries.
The mechanism of constraint here is social sanctions in terms of a loss of
reputation that will be suffered by those who reject the widely accepted norm
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(see Keohane, 1984: 94, 104-06). The second is to socialize non-ASEAN
countries into ASEAN's cooperative security norm. ASEAN's ultimate goal
in the ARF is to share its norm with all the participant countries through
socialization (see Johnston, 2001; Johnston, 2008; Finnemore and Sikkink,
;|v 1998: 895, 902-04; Risse and Sikkink, 1999).
* The core elements of ASEAN's cooperative security enterprise can be
encapsulated by making an analogy: the ARF can be described as a 'brewery'
of norms, or a 'norm brewery' (Katsumata, 2009a: 8-9). In a brewery, a new
beverage is brewed from a blend ofdifferent ingredients, through collaborative
work between the brewmaster and his/her assistants. What determines the
taste of the beverage is the preference of the former. In ASEAN's cooperative
security enterprise, the role of this Southeast Asian association is analogous
to that of a brewmaster in a brewery. ASEAN's speciality is Asian medicinal
liquor, whose effect is different from that of modern pharmaceuticals. Such
liquor can improve and sustain our health over the long term, while modern
pharmaceuticals are effective for acute care but have side effects. In concrete
terms, what ASEAN is promoting in the ARF is cooperative security, the utility
of which can be distinguished from that ofpower-balancing measures such as
collective defence. The former is meant to improve the regional security
environment in the long run by reducing tensions, thereby eliminating the root
causes of conflict. The latter can have an immediate effect, but inevitably
causes a security dilemma.
Why is cooperative security in Asia informal? Why has ASEAN not done
anything beyond the promotion of its norm? This question can be approached
in at least three ways, which are all mutually compatible. One way is to focus
on the China factor. According to Alastair Iain Johnston, when they established
the ARF in the early 1990s, the ASEAN countries were aware of Beijing's
wariness ofhighly institutionalized frameworks, and thus decided to start from
:| a weakly institutionalized forum (Johnston, 1999; Johnston, 2008: Chapter 4).
Another possible way is to adopt a rationalist perspective and to focus on
strategic calculations. Miles Kahler argues that the Southeast Asian countries'
aversion to a highly institutionalized framework is both instrumental and
strategic. It is instrumental in that it results from their consideration for the
cost to sovereignty. It is strategic in that they reject binding and precise
obligations in a setting that might require bargaining with governments with
greater powers (Kahler, 2000: 562, 568-69).
Finally, this issue can be approached from a constructivist perspective, by
focusing on ASEAN's traditional diplomatic norm: all that is required by such
a norm is an informal approach to cooperation. Amitav Acharya (2004) argues
that the ASEAN counties have 'localized' the norm of common security that
had been developed in Europe during the Cold War to ensure that it fits with
the local diplomatic norm in Southeast Asia. ASEAN's norm is associated with
the notion of the ASEAN way of diplomacy, which underlines the member
countries' commitment to the habit of dialogue and consultation, aimed at
enhancing a sense of mutual understanding and trust. The ASEAN way calls
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for an informal and gradual approach to cooperation based on consultation and
dialogue, while rejecting rigid rules and a rapid institutionalization of a
framework for cooperation. Its particular elements include decision-making
through consensus, mutual respect for state sovereignty, the non-use of force,
and non-interference in the internal affairs of other member states (see
Katsumata, 2003).
Intra-regional comparison
In what ways have the East Asian countries combined the two measures -
power balancing and cooperative security - discussed above? In what terms
have they defined the relations between these two measures? These measures
can be combined in different ways, and their relations can be defined
differently. To be specific, there are two ways of defining their relations: as a
complement or as a substitution.
On the one hand, countries may prioritize power-balancing measures, and
use cooperative security as a complement to these measures. Cooperative
security may complement power balancing by mitigating the security dilemma
that it creates. Although power-balancing measures can serve as an emergency
means for dealingwith directmilitaryconfrontations, they inevitablybringabout
mutual suspicion and a security dilemma. In such a case, cooperative security
activities may play a role by serving as a mechanism for defusing the conflictual
by-products ofpower-balancing practices (Khong, 1997:298). In this view, the
relevance ofcooperative security is a function of that ofpower balancing. The
greater tension in the power relationsbetweenthe countries involved, the greater
the need for them to develop cooperative mechanisms. In Figure 4.1, when the




Figure 4.1 Cooperative security as a complement
Power-politics
arrangements
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Cooperative security
Figure 4.2 Cooperative security as a substitution
On the other hand, countries may prioritize cooperative security, thereby
pursuing it as a substitute for power-balancing measures. The former may
substitute for the latter, by serving as an alternative way of approaching
regional security, which relieson non-confrontational and non-militarymeans.
Cooperative security is aimed at improving the security environment in the
long run withoutbringingabout a securitydilemma. In this view, the relevance
of power balancing is a function of that of cooperative security. When
cooperative security relations between countries develop, the necessity for them
to rely on power-politics arrangements is reduced. In Figure4.2, when the value
on the jc-axis increases, that on the >>-axis decreases.
These two distinct approaches have been taken by the Northeast and
Southeast Asian countries respectively - the point that this section seeks to
demonstrate. On the one hand, the Northeast Asian countries have adopted the
complementarity approach: they have prioritized power-balancing measures,
and used cooperative security as a complement to these measures. On the other
hand, the Southeast Asian countries have adopted the substitution approach:
they have prioritized cooperative security, thereby pursuing it as a substitute
for power-balancing measures.
To illustrate the difference between the Northeast and Southeast Asian
countries, the rest of this section makes an intra-regional comparison in East
Asia. To be specific, it compares the policies ofJapan and ASEAN, given that
both these parties have been concerned about the security posture of China. It
is worth noting that Japan and many of the ASEAN countries have territorial
disputes with China. On the one hand, Japan is in dispute with Beijing over
the Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands, and over the boundary in the East China Sea,
which is rich in natural resources. On the other hand, many of the ASEAN
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members - Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei - are in dispute
with Beijing over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. It should be noted
that when they deal with external powers, the ASEAN countries act as one
body and speak with one voice to advance their common interests.
To put it briefly, the next sub-section argues that the core element of
Japanese security policy in the post-Cold War era has always been based on
the logic of power balancing. In an attempt to deal with various external
challenges in Northeast Asia, including its rivalries with China, Tokyo has
strengthened its alliance with Washington. A side effect ofthis policy has been
the aggravation ofa security dilemma in NortheastAsia. Thus, as a complement
to power balancing, Tokyo has pursued multilateral cooperative security by
involving itself in ASEAN's cooperative security enterprise.
The sub-section after this demonstrates that since the early 1990s the
ASEAN countries have actively pursued multilateral cooperation, and sought
to promote their cooperative security norm. To be sure, these countries have
not been able to dispense with their bilateral security partnership with the US,
since their norm-building enterprise is still in the process of development.
Nevertheless, their enterprise has had a certain impact on the regional
security environment. In particular, ASEAN-China relations have improved
dramatically since the early 1990s.
Northeast Asia: Japan
The logic of power balancing constitutes the core of Japan's security policy
in the post-Cold War era. Since the 1990s, Japan has sought to strengthen,
rather than weaken, the security measures that had been established to counter
balance the threat of the communist camp during the Cold War. Against the
background ofvarious security challenges in post-Cold War Asia, such as the
rise of China, it has constantly modernized its Self-Defense Forces (SDF).
Moreover, it has introduced a number of new measures to strengthen its
military ties with the US.
Several key events have underscored Tokyo's intention to strengthen its
alliance with Washington. In April 1996, Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto
and President Bill Clinton issued a Joint Declaration on Security, and
'celebrated one of the most successful bilateral relationships in history'. They
stated that the security relationship between the two countries would remain
the 'cornerstone for ... maintaining a stable and prosperous environment
for the Asia-Pacific region' (Japan and the US, 1996). On the basis of this
declaration, in the following year, the two countries issued new Guidelines
for Defense Cooperation, replacing the original Guidelines issued in 1978. In
December 2003, Tokyo officially decided to introduce the Ballistic Missile
Defense (BMD) system, thereby further strengthening its technological
cooperation with Washington (Cabinet Secretariat, 2003). In 2004, when
Washington brought up the idea of relocating its air force headquarters from
Japan to Guam, as part of its worldwide realignment ofUS forces in the post-
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9/11 era, Japan objected to such an idea, due to its concern for deterrence
(Yomiuri Shimbun, 2004). In 2006, during the US-Japan Security Consultative
Committee (SCC) - the so-called 2+2 meeting - the foreign and defence
ministers of the two countries stressed the importance of improving the inter
operability of Japan's SDF and US Forces (US-Japan Security Consultative
Committee, 2006). In the 2007 SCC, the four ministers underlined several new
measures to strengthen the two countries' cooperation, in particular, in the area
of BMD (US-Japan Security Consultative Committee, 2007).
Japan's power-balancing policy has been successful, to the extent that it has
been able to prevent military clashes: however, at the same time, such a policy
has failed to prevent the aggravation ofa security dilemma in Northeast Asia.
It is hard to find evidence that the Sino-Japanese security tensions have eased
over the last decade. On the one hand, Beijing attacks Tokyo's defence
policies:
[Complicated security factors in the Asia-Pacific region are on the
increase ... Japan is ... adjusting its military and security policies and
developing the missile defense system for future deployment. It has also
markedly increased military activities abroad.
(Information Office of the State Council of China, 2004).
On the other hand, Japan's National Defense Program Guideline, approved by
the Cabinet on December 2004, explicitly mentions Beijing as its security
concern by using the strongest language it has ever used:
China, which has a major impact on regional security, continues to
modernize its nuclear forces and missile capabilities as well as its naval
and air forces. China is also expanding its area of operation at sea. We
will have to remain attentive to its future actions.
(Japan Defense Agency, 2004)
It is known that sometime in 2003-04 the Japanese SDF drew up a confidential
security plan that maps out the country's military responses to possible Chinese
military attacks against Japan (Asahi Shimbun, 2005).
Tokyo seems to be aware of the operation of a security dilemma, as it has
actively taken part in ASEAN's cooperative security enterprise. It was in the
early 1990s that Japan began to pursue cooperative security. At the time, Japan
needed to reassure its Asian neighbours that its active foreign policies in the
post-Cold War era were not ill-motivated. Thus, in 1991, it called for a
multilateral security dialogue to be carried out within the framework of the
ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC).5 Since the first meeting of the
ARF in 1994, Japan has been one of the most active supporters of ASEAN's
initiative. While stating that 'Japan's defense forces are the ultimate guarantee
of its national security,' and the 'US military presence is critically important',
its 2004 National Defense Program Guideline notes the development of
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multilateral frameworks such as the ARF: 'By continuing to support these
positive developments, Japan will continue to play an appropriate role ... to
promotea stable security environment in the region' (Japan Defense Agency,
2004). In the ARF, Japan expresses its 'hope that China will continue its
economic development... in harmony with the international community ...
and will carry out its role as a responsible major power' (Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Japan, 2009).
Southeast Asia: ASEAN
The ASEAN countries in the post-Cold War era have actively pursued
multilateral cooperative security, and sought to promote the norm of security
cooperation across the Asia-Pacific region. In the early 1990s, these countries
took the lead in initiating cooperative security and invited China to take part
in the ARF, although it was Beijing that constituted their primary external
security concern. Since then, they have constantly pursued a policy ofengage
ment toward Beijing, and always placed emphasis on multilateral cooperation.
To be sure, many of the ASEAN countries have also maintained security ties
with the US on a bilateral basis. Their norm-building enterprise is still in
the process of development, and thus they have not been able to dispense
with their security partnerships with Washington. However, their ties with
Washington are less significant than those of Japan. The arrangements of
Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore to allow US warships to visit their ports
do not guarantee Washington's significant military commitment. It is true that
some countries such as the Philippines have sought additional measures to
strengthen their relations with the US in the last decade, but these measures
have been concentrated in the area of counter-terrorism. It is fair to state that
in the area ofinter-state security relations with external powers, the main focus
of the ASEAN countries has been on multilateral cooperative security.
Remarkably, the security environment in Southeast Asia seems to be
improving. In particular, the ASEAN countries have managed to improve
their relations with China. In the early 1990s, they regarded China as a non-
like-minded country; today, however, the key term in ASEAN-China relations
is 'partnership'. In October 2003, the two parties issued a Joint Declaration
on Strategic Partnership (ASEAN and China, 2003), and in November 2004,
they adopted a Plan ofAction to implement this declaration. By so doing, they
sought to strengthen their partnership in a wide range of issue areas, including
politics, the economy, social affairs, security and international and regional
affairs (ASEAN and China, 2004).
The change in China's attitude toward multilateral cooperative security
demonstrates the fruitfulness ofASEAN's enterprise. Few would disagree with
the claim that, although its attitude was cautious in the early 1990s, Beijing
today is actively involved in forums such as the ARF. Yet sceptics argue that
China's active involvement in multilateralism should be seen as part of its effort
to constrain US diplomacy in Asia, so as to expand its sphere of influence at
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the expense of Washington's. Multilateralism by definition challenges
bilateralism and unilateralism, both of which are Washington's modus
operandi, as Beijing sees it (See Emmers, 2003: 124-25, 163; Wang, 2000:
483,485; Roy, 2003: 70-71; Li, 2004: 65). However, the sceptics' case is weak
because China has pursued multilateral cooperation even in areas where the
US is not involved. In 2002, this country demonstrated its commitment to
multilateralism by signing a declaration on a code of conduct in the South
China Sea (ASEAN and China, 2002; see also China and the Philippines,
2007). Moreover, in 2003 it acceded to ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and
Cooperation, which is regarded as a non-aggression pact. It is worth noting
that China acceded to this legal document when the US had not indicated any
intention ofdoing the same. These developments are significant because they
may constrain the power-politics behaviours of Beijing but not those of
Washington. China's cooperative policies in these cases suggest that its
motives are not limited to its strategic considerations vis-a-vis Washington (see
Katsumata et al., 2008; Katsumata, 2009a: Chapter 6).
Last but not least, the successful initiation on the part of ASEAN of East
Asian regionalism also demonstrates the fruitfulness ofASEAN's cooperative
security enterprise, in terms of the improvement of ASEAN-China relations.
The establishment of the APT and the EAS deserves special attention.
From the realist point of view, these channels can be seen as a framework
within which ASEAN promotes a security dialogue with a potential adversary
- i.e. China - while excluding an important security partner- i.e. the US. These
East Asian frameworks involve a major power with which the ASEAN
countries should seek a balance but not their crucial security partner. If
ASEAN had relied solely on power-politics arrangements with Washington
in the 1990s, it would probably not have been able to establish this kind of
framework. ASEAN's multilateral engagement strategy, adopted in the early
1990s, has enabled the association to pursue further cooperative policies
toward the Northeast Asian countries.
What factors have shaped the difference between the policies of Japan
and ASEAN? Why has the Southeast Asian association placed more emphasis
on cooperative security than has Japan? ASEAN's preference for coopera
tive security should be understood in terms of a set of ideas associated with
security cooperation, which the Japanese have not internalized. The Southeast
Asians have shared an understanding about an appropriate approach to regional
security, in the spirit of which they sought to promote their cooperative
security norm across the Asia-Pacific region (Katsumata, 2006; Katsumata,
2009a).
ASEAN's preference cannot be altogether understood from the viewpoint
of power calculations. Given the significance of the power gap between
ASEAN and China, the Southeast Asian countries could have sought stronger
security ties with the US. Indeed, in the early 1990s, along with the inclusive
framework ofthe ARF, they had at least two other policy options, both ofwhich






they could have chosen not to promote multilateralism at all, but rather to have
concentrated on their bilateral military relations with certain external powers
such as the US. Second, they could have pursued limited multilateralism. In
other words, they could have limited the inclusiveness of a new multilateral
framework, by not inviting non-like-minded countries at the time such as
China, Russia and Vietnam, to take part. A non-inclusive arrangement would
have been easier than an inclusive one, because Washington was reluctant to
engage in Asia-Pacific region-wide frameworks in the early 1990s (see
Solomon, 1990; Zoellick, 1991). The pursuit of this option might have served
as a means to 'soft balance' the power ofChina and to hold its policy in check.
However, the Southeast Asian countries pursued neither of these two options.
Instead, they chose a policy of engagement toward Beijing, and initiated an
accommodative forum, the ARF. It is worth adding that ASEAN's engagement
policy toward Beijing cannot be seen as a strategy of 'bandwagoning'. It is
hard to argue that ASEAN chose one side over the other. The ARF is an
inclusive framework, whose participants include not only China but also other
countries, such as the US and Japan.
Moral appropriateness
One crucial issue remains unaddressed: which measures are more appropriate?
Bearingin mind that the relationship between powerbalancingand cooperative
security can be defined differently, which of these two measures is the moral
superior? A majority of students of IR would probably argue that cooperative
security is more desirable, although it is by no means easy to promote 'coopera
tion under anarchy' (Oye, 1985; Axelrod and Keohane, 1985) because a
'struggle forpower' is commonin 'politicsamongnations' (Morgenthau, 1960).
However, East Asian security is a complex subject, and what seems to be a
simple question may involve a numberofcomplicated issues. It is too simplistic
to assume that cooperative security is morally superior to power balancing.
In exploringappropriate ways ofregional securitygovernance, it is important
to broaden our perspective and bring into view 'human security' issues.
Although the analysis thus far has been premised implicitly on the notion of
'national security,' the concept of human security should not be neglected in
any discussion of regional security governance in East Asia. Many of the
governments of the East Asian countries are undemocratic, and many of the
people in this region have been under political oppression. Undeniably, in
recent years the ASEAN members have begun to implement the liberal reform
of their association, thereby pursuing liberal norms concerning human rights
and democracy. They have been under pressure from the North American and
European countries, and also recognized the legitimacy of these liberal norms
in today's global society (Katsumata, 2009b). Nevertheless, if we are to focus
on the broader East Asian region, a more complex picture emerges.
For the sake ofhuman security in East Asia, cooperative security can hardly
be considered an appropriate measure for regional governance. This is because
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it would create two types of walls that would keep East Asia secluded from
the advancement ofhuman security in the global society, namely, material and
ideational walls. The material wall is constituted by strong ties between
ASEAN and China. This wall would insulate ASEAN from Western pressure,
thereby making it difficult for the North American and European powers to
exercise influence over the Southeast Asian countries in the area of human
rights. It would do so by reducing the need for these countries to succumb
to Western pressure. If concordant relations between ASEAN and China
developed as a result of cooperative security, whenever the Western powers
attempted to put pressure on the former, it would always be able to turn to the
latter as an alternative partner. Unlike the North American and European
powers, China would not criticize ASEAN's human rights record.
The ideational wall is constituted by an East Asian identity, the elements
of which do not include liberalism. This would keep East Asia secluded
from the development in the global society ofliberal norms concerning human
rights and democracy. The promotion of cooperative security would facilitate
the construction of an East Asian identity. This is because cooperative inter
state relations must facilitate international exchanges, which are the basis
for forming collective identities (Adler and Barnett, 1998: especially page 41;
Barnett and Adler, 1998: 416-18; Wendt, 1994: 388-91; Wendt, 1999:
343-63). Yet the political orientation of an East Asian identity would not be
liberal. This is evident from the list ofagenda items in the strategic partnership
between two important parties to East Asian cooperation, namely, China and
ASEAN. Excluded from this list are issues such as human rights and democracy
(ASEAN and China, 2003; ASEAN and China, 2004).
The problem here can be described as a 'human security dilemma' in
East Asia: the promotion of cooperative security relations between East
Asian countries would jeopardize the security of the people in this region.
Cooperative security may seem morally appropriate because it is free from a
security dilemma in the traditional sense. Nevertheless, itspromotion ironically
puts human security at risk. This is probably the most problematic aspect of
East Asian regional security governance.
There is no simple solution to this dilemma. Yet it can be said, at least, that
the involvement of civil society organizations (CSOs) in regional security
governance is crucial. One characteristic common to power balancing and
cooperative security inEast Asia is the absence ofcivil society actors. Regional
security governance in this region is dominated by the governments. To be
fair, some non-governmental actors are involved in cooperative security
activities; however, theirpolitical status is unique. Theyare commonly referred
to as 'track-two' actors, whose role is to support intergovernmental cooperation
at the 'track-one' level. Those actors within track-two frameworks such as the
ASEAN Institute ofStrategic and International Studies (ISIS) and the Council
for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) would hardly take a
critical attitude toward their own governments. Absent from East Asian





by CSOs. This inevitably limits the range of agenda items for regional
cooperation. A sensible starting point for those who work toward human
security governance in East Asia must be to provide support to SCO activities
in this region.
Conclusions
What do the arguments in this chapter imply for the overall themes of this
edited volume, i.e. the density and normativity ofregional security governance?
The arguments suggest at least three things. First, the governance ofinter-state
security relations can be dense in several different ways - on the basis ofseveral
different elements - and thus its density cannot be assessed along a single
continuum. This chapter has identified the difference between the policies of
the Northeast and Southeast Asian countries. Yet their difference by no means
suggests that the density of regional security governance in the one area is
greater than that in the other. In both Northeast and Southeast Asia, the
density of governance is significant. In other words, in both areas there is a
strong consensus in the discourse ofregional security, and countries have been
making substantial joint efforts - either bilaterally or multilaterally - on the
basis of the shared recognition that security problems can be managed only
through collaboration beyond national borders (see Breslin and Croft in this
volume). The only difference between the two areas concerns the elements of
density. On the one hand, the main element ofdensity in Northeast Asia is the
material power of countries, embodied in their hard-balancing strategies.
Here, density is achieved on the basis ofa patchwork ofbilateral arrangements,
centred on a global superpower. On the other hand, the main element ofdensity
in Southeast Asia is the norm of security cooperation. There, density is
maintained by an association of minor powers, through an informal approach
to cooperation. In this regard, it can be said that material power is not a
prerequisite for making the governance of inter-state security relations dense.
A norm-building exercise initiated by a group of minor powers is sufficient
for dense governance.
Second, the density of governance in one issue area can sometimes have a
negative impact on that in another. Regional security governance involves
collaboration beyond national borders, and thus the implications of its density
should usually be positive. It is not hard to imagine that collective defence
arrangements can facilitate cooperation in many other fields, for example.
Today, on the basis of their existing bilateral security treaties, the US and its
partners, such as the Philippines and Japan, are developing measures to crack
down on terrorist activities or to prevent the proliferation ofWMDs. However,
what the argument in this chapter suggests is that dense collaboration in one
area can sometimes work against that in another. With regard to the governance
of inter-state security relations in the form ofcooperative security, the greater
its density becomes, the less likely would be the development ofcollaborative
efforts to address human security threats. This is because cooperative security
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would create material and ideational walls, which would keep the region
secluded from the advancementof human security in the global society. After
all, security governance is all about changing the material and ideational
structure of the region, and the implicationsofchange are not always positive.
This relates to the next point.
Finally, the density ofregional security governance and its moral/normative
appropriateness are two separate issues, and the former does not necessarily
guarantee the latter. In other words, greater density does not necessarily mean
superior morality. Indeed, on many occasions, greater density even means
inferior morality, and the danger is often less than obvious. It can be said that,
although the density of governance is significant in both Northeast and
Southeast Asia, moral problems exist in both areas. The power-balancing
measures taken by the Northeast Asian countries are morally questionable
because these measures inevitably create a security dilemma. The cooperative
security policies implemented by the Southeast Asian countries are equally -
or perhaps more - problematic, although these policies are usually seen as more
desirable. This is because they bring about what can be regarded as a human
security dilemma, thereby jeopardizing the security of the people in the East
Asian region. In this respect, an important task in regional security governance
is to make a connection between its density and its moral/normative
appropriateness, in order to avoid cultivating the former at the expense of the
latter.
Notes
1 The membership of ASEAN expanded in the latter half of the 1990s - Vietnam
joinedin 1995, Laos and Myanmar didso in 1997 and, finally, in 1999, Cambodia
became the tenth member.
2 With regard to the path-dependent development of security governance measures,
thestudy ofJ. J. SunonSouth Korea isworth mentioning. Suhexplores thequestion
of why Seoul continues to ally itself with Washington, although it has strong and
modern military forces, and underlines the relevance of the 'alliance assets', such
as the interoperability of military technologies between Washington and Seoul
(Suh, 2004).
3 In this definition two elements are critical: inclusiveness/indivisibility and the non-
use of military force for coercive purposes. First, the cooperative approach to
security is inclusive, in that no particular parties are excluded or regarded as
opponents. Security is treated as something 'indivisible' and is sought through
cooperative undertakings. According to John Ruggie, the notion of indivisibility
is one of the important elements of multilateralism (1993: 11). Second, the non-
use of military force for coercive purposes is one of the characteristics that
distinguish cooperative security from conventional security mechanisms, such as
collective defence and collective security.
4 The APT and the EAS are by definition not fully inclusive in terms of their
participant countries. However, the fruit of the activities within these frameworks
is by no means exclusive. What is sought is a peaceful and stable regional security
environment; its nature is different from the kind of security pursued through




5 At the ASEAN-PMC in July 1991, the Japanese Foreign Minister, Taro Nakayama,
noted the need for Japan to reassure its Asian neighbours and called for a security
dialogue to be carried out within the framework ofthe ASEAN-PMC (Nakayama,
1991).More remarkably, as early as 1991,officials ofthe Japanese foreign ministry
had explored the idea of inviting China to take part in a security dialogue (see Satoh,
1994: 15-16).
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